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Heavy exposure to risk in bank loan portfolios, together with the
introduction  of highercapital requirements,  suggests  a slowdown
in the growth of credit. That means weaker U.S. investment and
consumption may be expected as well as less credit to the highly
indebted countries.
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Prywes examines the financial condition of the  highly indebted countries. Such lending is
U.S. commercial banks and of the main private  unlikely to recover rapidly - except at exorbi-
borrowing sectors - households and corporate  tant rates. If this cycle follows its historic
nonfinancial businesses.  pattern, there will be an upswing in the growth of
bank lending in the longer term, providing new
He finds that the bank's loan portfolios  opportunities for creditworthy developing
expose them to the risk of high losses. That risk  countries.
- together with the forthcoming increase in the
required ratio of capital to assets -gives  banks  Financial problems are likely outside the
the incentive to build capital, which they may do  United States, partly because of links between
by slowing down the growth of credit.  real interest rates and the covariance of equity
prices. This suggests protracted high global
One consequence would be weaker U.S.  rates and limited private credit flows for devel-
investment and consumption.  opment.  This conclusion needs to be sharpened
by comparative research on the industrial
Moreover, credit would probably be directed  countries.
away from higher risk borrowers such as the
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Risk  Facing  US  Commercial  Banks:
Recent  Trends  anu  Implications  for  the  Economic  Outlook.
Abstract:  The study  examines the financial  condition  of  the  US commercial  banks
and  of  the  main  private  borrowing  sectors:  corporate  non-financial  business  and
households.  The study  finds  that the  ta  of  the loan portfolio  of the banks exposes  them
to high  losses.  This risk  together  with  the forthcoming  increase of  the required  ratio  of
capital  to assets  suggests  that  banks  will respond  by slowing  the growth  of  credit.  One
consequence  would  be  weaker US investment  and consumption.  Moreover,  credit  would
probably  be  directed  away  from  higher  risk  borrowers  such  as  the  highly  indebted
countries.
This  is a study  of  the implications  of the loan  portfolio  of US commercial  banks
and  the  debt  carried  by  the  main  borrowing  sectors  for  the  economic  outlook.  The
interaction  of these stocks with f2ow variables  can contribute  to turns  in the real  business
cycle.  For instance,  excessive corporate  debt relative  to value-added  increases  the risk of
failure,  which can raise the real rate of interest  paid by corporations  and depress corporate
investment.  In another  example, high consumer debt relative  to personal  income can slow
personal  consumption  expenditures.  Therefore,  the study  examines  the evolution  of  the
debt  stock  to  income  flow  of  each  of  the  main  US  borrowing  sectors  for  plausible
inferences  about  the real-side  outlook  for the  US economy.
The interaction  of stocks  and flows also influences  domestic  inflation  and  interest
rates.  Intern.ational  trade  and capital  markets  provide linkages  through  which shocks can
spread  between  countries.  The  dynamics  of  financial  stocks  and  flows are  particularly
important  in  the  determination  of exchange  rates.  So this  study  should  provide  useful
background  material  for the Short-Term Outlook  and Long-Term Prospect  papers produced
by the  International  Economics  Department  of the World Bank.
This  study should  be useful because most analysis  of the real  outlook  concentrates
on real flow variables  and  because most econometric  forecasting  models neglect financial
stocks  and  flows.  Household  wealth may be the  only financial  stock  variable,  and  there
are  usually  no  financial  flows.  The  research  program  of  the  Analysis  and  Prospects
division emphasizes the development  of an international  data base,  DAD, that  will support
Development  of  an  internationally  linked  econometric  model  (Bank-GEM).  DAD  will
document the flow of commercial bank credit between countries  along with other important
financial  stocks  and  flows.  The behavior  of critical  financial  variables  will have  to  be
specified  in the model, so this  study  can also be seen as backgrourd  for the  specification
of Bank-GEM.
The flow of commercial bank credit  to the developing countries  will be an important
linkage  in Bank-GEM.  Most studies treat  such lending as depending mainly on the credit-
worthiness  of  the  developing  countries.  However,  commercial  bank  lending  to  the2
developing  countries  4nks  can  be influenced  by all  entries  in the  bank  balance  sheet.  For
instance,  an  increase  in  the  risk  of  loan  losses  in  other  areas  of  the  loan  portfolio  might
lead  banks  to  raise  capital  ratios  by  slowing  the  growth  of lending.  This  could  also  result
from  an  increase  in  required  capital  ratios.  Weaker  expansion  of  lending  would  then
reduce  lending  to  the  developing  countries.  At  the  same  time  changes  in  the  risk  of
alternative  loans  might  influence  lending  to  the  developing  countries.
Further  research  should  concentrate  on  credit  and  debt  stocks  in  other  industrial
countries.  This  would  be worthwhile  because  financial  stock-flow  imbalances  could  develop
in  several  countries  at  once.  For  instance,  stresses  in the  US and  Japanese  banking  sectors
could  combine  to  raise  real  interest  rates.  This  kind  of development  is difficult  to  model.
Moreover,  pressures  on  equity  and  real  estate  markets  may  develop  at  the  same  time  in
several  countries,  affecting  the  financial  position  of their  commercial  banks.
Position  of  the  US  commercial  banks.
US commercial  banks  are  not  the  only  source  of private  credit  in  the  United  States.
Insurance  companies,  Savings  and  Loan  banks,  foreign  banks,  and  other  types  of
institutions  extend  credit.  However,  commercial  bank  lending  is  particularly  interesting
because  it  played  a  prominent  role  in  sectors  of  the  economy  which  expanded  quickly  in
the  1980s  and  which  may  fluctuate  widely  in  the  1990s.  These  sectors  include  investments
by  highly  leveraged  corporate  business,  and  residential  and  business  construction.
Moreover,  the  commercial  banks  are  of special  interest  to the  World  Bank  because  of their
role  in  lending  to  developing  countries  in  the  1970s  and  in  the  debt  crisis  of  the  1980s.
The  loan  portfolio  of  the  commercial  ban'!,.  Figure  1 displays  the  share  of  assets
of  various  classes  of bank  loans.  The  purpose  of the  diagram  is  to  show  the  evolution  of
the  loan  portfolio  over  time.  Overall  loans  maintained  a steady  shlare  of assets,  but  the
share  of consumer  and  real  estate  lending  increased  as the  share  of fo.reign  lending  (which
includes  loans  to  the  developing  countries)  decreased.  The  Figure  shows  that  the  share
of  lending  to  commerce  and  industry  (including  other  loans)  followed  a  downward  trend.
Charge-off  rates  are  an  indicator  of  the  risk  to  banks  of holding  each  type  of loan.'
Table  1 presents  a  breakdown  of charge-off  rates  from  1985 through  1989. The  charge-offs
rate  on  loans  to  foreign  borrowers  reached  about  21  percent  of  such  loans  in  1989.  The
rate  on  real  estate  and  consumer  lending  also  drifted  upward  in  1989.  Noie  the  high  rate
on  consumer  credit  card  lending  relative  to  most  other  types  of  loans.  In  contrast,  the
charge-off  rate  on  loans  to  domestic  commercial  and  industrial  borrowers  remained
relatively  low.
'A bank  'charges-of!  a loan  when it realizes  its loss on a loan against  reserves or other  assets. A charge  off rate
is the amount  of losses  charged  off as a percentage  of assets.3
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figure 1. Source,  Board  of Govemors,  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.  July 1990,  p 490.4
This  highly aggregate data  on the composition  of the loan  portfolio  and  on charge-
off rates  reveal  contradictory  trends  in the riskiness of the portfolio.  The share  of lower
risk  commercial  and  industrial  lending  is falling  slightly,  while the  share  of higher  risk
consumer  credit  lending  is rising  (where risk  is judged  by the charge-off  rate).  The only
risk  reducing  adjustment  is  a  decline  in  the  share  of  foreign  lending.  Of course,  this
analysis  is too  aggregate  to  permit  a strong  conclusion.
Table  1
Net  Charge-Off  Rates  of
US  Commercial  Banks  with  Assets  over  $300  Million
(in  percent  of assets)
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total  Loans  .75  .89  .91  1.03  1.21
Commercial  and  Industrial  1.02  1.14  .96  .95  .93
US addresses  .94  1.10  .86  .82  .78
Foreign  addresses  1.25  1.29  1.35  1.55  1.70
Consumer  1.24  1.58  1.58  1.52  1.63
Credit-card  2.57  3.28  3.26  3.08  3.05
Installment  .63  .75  .74  .73  .90
Real  Estate  .22  .38  .47  .42  .52
Foreign  government  .84  .47  2.58  9.35  17.01
Depository  institutions  .15  .36  .56  .98  1.35
US banks  .12  .33  .11  .15  .19
Foreign  Banks  .15  .36  .96  1.83  2.52
Source: Board  of Governor,  Federal  Reserve Bulletin,  July
1990,  p  485.For example, the commercial and industrial  lending category,  which has a relatively
low charge-off  rate,  includes  le  ling  for  highly leveraged transactions  (HLTs). 2 Table  2
presents  a  loan  portfolio  of  the  US  commercial  bank  which  breaks  out  some  of  the
particularly  risky  types  of lending.  The table  is for  the  1988 portfolio  because it  is not
yet possible  to  estimate  some of the components  for  1989.
Table  2
Loan  Portfolio  of the  Insured  US  Commercial  Banks:
December  31,  1988
ecentage  Billions  of
Point  Share  US
l  ~~~~~~~~~  ~~~~~of  Assets  D)ollars
Domestic  Industrial  and  Commercial  16.5  489.7
for  HLTs (a)  3.0  90.0
Others  13.5  399.7
Foreign  (b)  4.2  125.2
to  HICs  (c)  2.4  71.5
Others  1.8  53.7
Real  Estate  20.6  608.4
Consumer  11.3  334.7
Credit  Card  3.1  92.6
Installment  8.2  242.1
Other  Lending  7.9  23S.2
Total  Loans  60.6  1792.9
Source:  Federzl  Reserve,  Comptroller  of the Currency  and  World Bank  Estimates.
(a)  Highly  Leveraged Transactions,  such as leveraged  buy-outs,  an  estimate  based  on
a survey  by the  Comptroller  of the Currency;  (b) to  private  and  official  borrowers;
(c)  17 Highly Indebted  Countries.
20ne simple  definition  from  the Office  of the Comptroller  of the Currency  Is that a highly  leveraged  transactions
Is  a corporate  restructuring  in  which  debt Is substituted  for  equity. In such transactions,  debt Is often  secured by  the
firm's  cash flow  and the firm  is usually  left  with  a debt-to-equity  wel above the Industry  average.6
Lending  for  highly  leveraged  transactions  (HLTs)  was about  S80 to  S100  billion
dollars  at the end  of  1988; the mid-.point estimate  of $90 billion  is 3% of assets.  This  is
an  estimattd  range  constructed  fro.n  partial  data  (including  some aggregate  results  of  a
survey conducted  by the Comptroller  of the Currency).  It is above other estimates,  which
find  net  exposure  of  $60 billion  or less.  US commercial bank  lending  to  the  17 Highly
Indebted  Countries  (HICs) stood  at $71.5 billion  and 2.4 percent  of assets.  So commercial
banks exposure  to  HLT lending surpassed  their exposure to  the HICs.  Real estate  lending
was 20.6 percent  of assets,  though  it is difficult  to  identify  the risky  component  of such
lending  (which  hap  been  be  mainly  in  residential  and  office  building  lending  in  the
Southwest  and  Northeast).  Credit  card  lending was 3.1 percent  of assets.
The risk  of losses on  lending  in  1988 was balanced  by bank  equity  capital  which
amounted  to 6.1 percent  ef  assets.  The risk of loss on some identifiable  problem  loans  is
offset  by  loan  loss  reserves.  In  contrast,  equity  may  offset  losses  on  any  loan.  A
comparison  of the equity-capital  ratio  with the share  of risky assets gives a rough  idea of
the potential  for unanticipated  losses to erode equity and force banks towarde  failure.  As
one would expect,  losses tend  to erode  the equity-assets  ratio  during  recessions.  Figure
2 shows that  the ratio  dipped  during  the  1975 and  1979 recessions.
Equi  t y-  Capi  t al  Rat i o  of  I nsur  ed  Commer ci  al  Banks
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Figure 27
Due to  a  change  in  regulations,  US commercial  banks  will, roughly  speaking,  be
required  to  hold  equity-capital  ratios  of  4  percent  of  (risk-adjusted)  assets.3 These
requirements  will take affect in 1992 with transitional  requirements  set for 1990. Moreover,
while  most  banks  already  satisfy  the  new capital  requirements,  there  is  an  important
minority  of large banks  that do not.  The Federal Reserve estimated  what the capital  ratios
of the  Bank  Holding  Companies  would have been  at  the end  of  1988 if  the new capital
requirements  had  been in force.  Table  3 presents  these estimates,  broken  down by asset
class.  (They have not  made a calculation  for  1989.)
Table  3 shows that  banks holding $235.7 billion in assets would not  have attained  the 1992
requirement  of  a  4  percent  equity-capital  ratio  if  the  requirement  had  been in  force  in
1988.  These  assets  comprise  7.6  percent  of  commercial  bank  assets.  The  problem  is
concentrated  within the largest  banks.  Top 25 banks  holding  16.8 percent  of top  25 bank
assets did  not  meet the minimum capital  requirement.
The failure  to meet the  1992 standard  capital  requirement  poses a problem  for  the
outlook  because  these  banks  will have to  raise  their  capital  ratio  at  a time  when slower
economic growth  may lead to  increased  loan  losses.  New capital  could  be  raised  by the
issue  of equity,  but  bank  equity  (stock)  prices might  be  depressed  over  the  next several
years.  Aa alternative  would be to raise  the ratio  by slowing the growth  of assets,  such as
loans,  which could  further  slow the real  growth  of the economy.
This  review of the position  of the  commercial banks  suggests that  this  is only one
factor  that  may lead to slower growth of credit.  The composition  of the loan portfolio  and
the evolution  of  charge-off  rates  also  suggest  a  need to  build  loan  loss reserves  and  to
charge-off losses, which could also slow the growth of credit.  Whether this in fact happens
will depend on a host  of factors,  such as monetary  and fiscal policy,  and developments  in
the  international  capital  markets.  It  will  also  depend  importantly  on  the  underlying
financial  strength  of the main borrowing  sectors.
sThe  new  regulations  will  require  banks  to attain  a 4 percent  ratio  of  Tier  I capital  and  an  8 percent  ratio  of  Tier  2
capital  relative  to  risk  weighted  assets.  Tier  I capital  is  roughly  the  same  as  equity:  it  consists  of  common  stock,  some
perpetual  preferred  stock  and some  minor  items. Tier  2 capital  adds  loan and lease  loss reserves  up to 1.25  percent
of  fisk weighted  assets,  perpetual  preferred  stock  and  some  minor  items. The  system  of risk  weighting  is Intended  to
oblige  banks  to hold  more  capital  against  riskier  assets.  For example,  a Owf ight is applied  to Federal  govemment  (and
some  Federal  Government  backed)  secudties,  a 50 percent  weight  for one  to four  family  conventional  mortgages,  and
a 100  percent  rate  formostother loans. Banks  mustalso  hold  capital  against  some  off-balance  sheet  exposure  to  risk.8
Real  Not  Wor  t h  of  Mal  or  Sect or s
15  (In  trItItess  @1 1163Ca4  doltarsI
14
1140  19SS  III?  1111  1ilS  l98  IM  §  1177  1911  1085  IM|
Figure 3. Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.
Overview  of  the  wcalth  of  the  main  borrowing  sectors.  One  measure  of
financial  strength  is  the  stock  of  assets  which  offsets  .he  stock  of  liabilities.  The
difference  between  the  two  is defined  as  net  worth.  Figure  3 presents  the  real  net  worth
of the  household,  corporate  non-financial,  and  private  financial  sectors."  Household  real
net  worth  climbed  along  a  trend  curve  since  World  War  II,  but  suffered  a  set-back  in  the
early  1980s.  The  financial  institutions  also  fared  well.  But  the  net  assets  of the  corporate
non-financial  sector  shifted  from  a  trend  rise  in  the  1970s to  a  trend  decline  in  the  1980s.
4The  real  figures  were  calculated  by dividingi  nominal  net  worth  by the consumer  price index, based  in 1982-84.9
Table  3
How  the  US  Insured  Commercial  Banks Would  Have  Fared  if
they  Had  Had to  Meet  1992 Capital  Requirements  in  1988:
2hc Distribution  of  Risk-WeigAted  Assets  agal-st  Equity
(Tier  1) Capital Ratios.
(in billions  of US dollars)
Asset  Class
Cagita  l  Raio  Less  GFeater  Top  25  Total
than  $1  than  $1 b.;;il
bill  except top
25
Less than  4%  23.5  47.8  164.4  235.7
4 to  8%  125.0  751.8  775.6  1652.4
Over 8 %  817.8  371.1  37.6  1226.5
. . ................................................................................  ..................................................
Total  966.3  1170.7  977.6  3114.6
% below req'mt  2.4  4.1  16.8  7.6
Source: Computed  from  Call Reports  by the  Federal  Reserve.
This results mainly from the absorption  of equity.  One study estimates that  between
1983 and  1984, firms spent  20 percent  of funds  raised  (including  internal  funds)  on  the
repurchase  of  equity.'  This  is  a  curious  and  perhaps  disturbing  trend.  The corporate
financial  corporate  sector is the main productive  sector of the economy.  And as the figure
shows, it did  not  lose value  in earlier  periods  of rapid  growth.
Unfortunately  the aggregate  statistics  are not  likely  to  reveal  much more.  That's
because  large  but  financially  fragile  groups  often  exist  within  a  sector.  For  instance
negative  net  worth  groups  probably  exist  within  the  wealthy  household  sector.  The
difficulty  of working with aggregates is evident from data  on the thrift  crisis.  The Savings
and  Loan  industry  as a whole had  steadily  positi-i  net income, but  the  fraction  with the
weakest net  worth  percent  produced  a crisis.
The  non-financial  corporate  sector.  The  ratio  of  credit  market  debt  to  the
value-added  of the  non-financial  corporate  sector  is a measure  of its  capacity  to  service
debt  from income  on current  operations  (Figure  4).  This  stock-flow  ratio  climbed  from
'See  Robert  Taggart,  *Corporate  Leverage  and the Restructuring  Movement  of the 1980s.-  Business  Economics
April 1990,  p 13.10
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the  early  1950s to  the, late  1970s;  it sagged  in  the  mid and  late  1970s  and  then  soared  after
198 1,  accelerating  past  its  previous  peak.  This  unusually  rapid  acceleration  and
historically  high  level  of  the  ratio  may  suggest  that  corporate  leverage  is  reaching  an
historic  peak.  The  press  often  treats  the  rise  of  leverage  as  a  novelty  rather  than  the
outgrowth  of  an  economic  process.
Yet  there  are  economic  reasons  for  the  increase  in  leverage.  Chief  among  these  is
disintermediation  from  the  banking  system.  Credit-worthy  non-financial  corporations
began  to  raise  relatively  cheap  funds  through  the  sale  of  securities  and  by  selling
commercial  paper  on  the  money  market  --so  that  banks  lost  their  best  customers.  In  a
recent  survey  conducted  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  bankers
"...disclosed  that  they  believed  highly  levcragcd  transactions  offer  them  a way  to  make  up
for  core  corporate  lending  business  that  is  disappearing.  They  said  that  the  strongest
corporations  no  longer  go  to  banks  for  funding,  but  rather  they  access  capital  markets11
directly.  They also  said  the junk  bond  market  hias taken  billions  of dollars  in  potential
loans  away from  banks."6
There are no  :m figures on lending for highly leveraged transactions.  Many banks
now report  such lending in their annual  reports,  but these figures are probably  understated.
The problem is that  many banks  apparently  define 'highly leveragei  transactions'  to avoid
reporting  their entire  exposure.  Typically banks define 'high'  leverage in a restrictive  way
.-so that  any higher risk loans  are excluded.  Moreove^ bank annual  reports  do not  reveal
exposure  at other  layers of the corporate  structure.
Keefe,  Bruyette  and  Woods  (private  bank  analysts)  argue  that  nIt  is  becoming
increasingly  clear  that  a  number  of the major  banking  companies  have  several  layers  of
involveMen  with the leveraged buy-out  (LBO) process.7  At the bank  level, they are senior
ienders;  et the holding company, they may be mezzanine lenders (subordinated),  and more
frequently  than  they  admit,  they  are  equity  participants,  if  not  directly  then  through
leveraged buy-out  equity funds run by the promoters  and sponsors  of leveraged buy-outs."8
In  a leveraged  buy-out  senior  debt  is  usually  secured  by the  assets  of  the  target
company.  Senior  debt must  be paid  first  in case of bankruptcy.  Mezzanine financing  is
subordinate  to senior  lending; it may include the non-investment  grade (junk)  bonds along
with  loans.  Equity  financtag  consists  of unsecured  common stock.  Equity  participation
is booked  at the bank  holding company level so it does not  appear  in financial  statements
at  the commercial bank  level.
The loan portfolio  statement  for  1988 places US commercial bank  holdings  at about
$99 billion  (Table  2).  This  is  roughly  consistent  with  an  estimate  by  IBCA,  a  British
private  bank  analysis firm.  These are holdings  of senior debt, and  are net of sales abroad
and  sa:es So other  sectors  of the domestic  economy.  So they  represent  the  extent  of US
commercial  bank  exposure.  The estimate  is  constructed  from  partial  results  of a  survey
of major  banks  by the Comptroller  of the Currency.9 This is the first  survey to  define  a
highly leveraged transaction  and to  legally mandate  a response,  so it is probably  the most
accurate  source.
OLeveraged Financing,  Comptroller of the Currency: Washington,  DC, p 6.
"An  LBO  is a common  form  of highly  leveraged  transaction  in  which  a group  of Investors  purchase  a firm,  and if
the firm  is publicly  quoted,  take it private.
$Keefe, Bruyette  & Woods.  'LBO's  Revisited: What  Most Major Banks are  Still Not Telling Us.-
Keefe Bank Industry Series,  February  16, 1989, p 2.
'Unfortunately the full results  have not been released.  The estimate is produced  from Industry wide
ratios released  by telephone.12
There  is often  a  strong  tone  to  the debate  on highly leveraged  transactions.  For
example:  "...unless  something  is done  to  forestall  excesses that  are almost  inevitable  ...
the  health  of  the  free  enterprise  system  of  the  United  States  will be  endangered."  '°
There  is,  in contrast,  a  paucity  of empirical  papers  on the  risk  of 'everage  to  the  non-
financial  corporate  sector.
A  paper  by  Bernanke  and  Campbell  is  one  of  the  exceptions."  The  authors
simulated  the  balance  sheets  of  the  major  US  corporations  under  recession  scenarios.
Their  detailed  data  base  allows  them  to  break-out  the  performance  of  the  weakest  10
percentile  of corporations.  Their  conclusion  is that  a  full-blown  debt  crisis  is unlikely.
However  their  data  extend  only  through  1986, so the  study  does  not  reflect  the  rapid
increases  in leverage of 1987 and  1988.  Another  weakness is that  authors  did not  simulate
a high interest  rate  recession --potentially  the most stressful  scenario  for  the sector.
That  study  is valuable  because it is a detailed  empirical  effort.  But it is probably
impossible  to  make  meaningful  empirical  predictions  of  non-financial  corporate
bankruptcies  without  anticipating  the  interaction  between  bankruptcies  and  borrowing
rates.  As  firms  fail,  expectations  shift  and  lenders  demand  higher  risk  premiums.
Regulators  may restrict  lending to  the troubled  sector and legislatures  may even pass laws
which make regulation  more severe.  The effect is to increase the interest  rate  risk premium
paid  by  troubled  companies,  a degenerative  process  which is typical  of  financial  crises.
The giant  household  sector  is also  potentially  vulnerable  to  this  kind  of shock.
The  household  sector.  The ratio  of net credit  market  debt to personal  income is
an  indicator  of the capacity  of households  to service debt from  current  income.  Figure  5
shows that  the ratio  moved steadily  upward from the early 1950s through  to the mid 1960s;
then  it showed signs of cyclical behavior:  the  ratio  dipped during  the  1971, 1974-85 and
1981-82 recessions.  The ratio  ascended  steeply in the  1980s and reached  an historic  peak
in  1988. This suggests that  high leverage could lead to less consumer borrowing  and hence
lower growth  of consumption.  This trend  may already  be evidenced by the  slight decline
in the ratio  reported  for  1989 and  by the slower growth  of consomption  during  1989 and
the first  half  of 1990.
More detailed  statistics  reveal  the sectors  which are likely  to  be most  affected  by
a  reduction  in household  leverage.  Figure  6 displays  the ratio  of  mortgages  to  personal
income, a measure of capacity to  service mortgage debt.  In the 1980s the ratio jumped far
'0Henry  Kaufman,  Statement before  the Committee  on Ways and Means, United States House of
Representatives,  February 1, 1989.
"Ben Bernanke  and John Campbell. *Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?, Brookings Papers on
Economic  Activity, Winter 1988,  pp  83-139. This study  was partly updated  by Bernanke,  Campbell  snd
Toni Whited, 'US Corporate  Leverage:  Developments  in 1987 and 1988.'  Federal Reserve  Finance
and Economics  Discussion  Series no. 113, Nov. 1989.13
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above  its  historic  trend.  It  should  be  no  surprise  that  the  edimate  for  1989  shows  a
decline  of  the  ratio.
Figure  7  displays  real  consumer  installment  debt  and  breaks  out  the  credit  card
component.  The  risk  of  lending  to  consumers  has  spread  across  the  economy  as  banks
securitized  consumer  loans.' 2 However  the  overall  risk  of  consumer  lending  may  have
increased  because  of  the  increased  leverage  of  households  and  because  of  the  increased
share  of  the  credit  card  component.  High  charge-off  rates  suggest  the  potential  risk
inherent  in credit-card  lending.  These  losses  are  higher  than  for  any  other  type  of lending,
excepting  the  foreign  lending  (Table  1).  Moreover  the  number  of  personal  bankruptcies
1 2Securitization  means  that  banks  package  consumer  loans  into  a standardized  instrument  (such  as  a bond)  that
can  be  traded  freely.14
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has  risen  sharply  (Figure  8).  A  1978  change  in  the  law  explains  some  of  this  increase.
Nevertheless  it  is somewhat  disturbing  that  bankruptcies  would  rise  so  quickly  during  the
recent  years  of  rapid  economic  expansion.
A  study  by  Fulton  and  Brown  argues  that  the  financial  condition  of  households  is
deteriorating,  possibly  because  of  the  increase  in  the  role  of  adjustable  rate  debt  in
consumer  liabilities.  They  conclude  that  a  sharp  increase  of  interest  rates  could  further
worsen  the  consumer  balance  sheet  and  lead  to  substantial  loan  losses.' 3
Other  analysts  believe  that  US  households  could  withstand  such  an  increase  of  interest
rates.  They  argue  that  the  household  sector  is  a  net  creditor  so  that  it  benefits  from  an
increase  of  interest  rates.' 4
Another  key  question  is  whether  the  households  with  the  debt  are  also  the
households  with  the  assets.  The  aggregate  household  sector  might  be  in  good  financial
health  while  there  may  be a  highly  indebted  class  of households  with  lots  of  variable  rate
debt  and  few  assets.  Data  are  available  in the  Survey  of  Consumer  Finance,  but  analysts
draw  conflicting  conclusions  from  the  same  data.  Fulton  and  Brown  find  that  the  heaviest
debt-using  class  of households  (headed  by  persons  under  65 and  receiving  less than  $50,000
per  year)  devote  about  20  percent  of  their  income  to  debt  service,  and  they  conclude  that
financial  stress  and  a large  cutback  of consumer  spending  is likely.  But  Goodman,  Luckett
and  Wilcox  interpret  the  Survey  differently,  finding  no  evidence  of  a  financially  stressed
minority  of households.  On  balance,  there  is enough  evidence  to justify  some  concern  for
the  increased  bank  exposure  to  consumer  and  especially  consumer  credit  card  debt.
Implications  for  the  Outlook.
The previous  sections have surveyed the condition  of the important  household,  non-
financial  corporate,  and  commercial  banking  sectors  of the  US economy.  These  conditions
do  have  some  immediate  implications  for  the  outlook.  For  instance,  high  leverage  of
househo:ds  could  lead  to  a continued  increase  of bankruptcies;  this  would  increase  losses
to  banks  and  cut  consumption  by  bankrupt  households;  as  a  l -sult  banks  might  ration
credit  away  from  consumers,  further  slowing  the  growth  of  real  consumer  spending.  This
sort  of  analysis  can  be made  in isolation  from  the  historical  record.  But  Hyman  Minsky,
" 3For example,  see  Fulton and  Brown, "Will  variable-rate  mortgages  doom the economic  doom?"
Market letter, A. Gary Shilling & Co., March 15, 1989.
'4See  Cantor.  wInterest Rates,  Household  Cash  Flow, and  Consumer  Expenditures.*  Federal
Reserve  Bank of New York Quarterly Review. Summer 1989, pp 59-67 and  Goodman. Luckett and
Wilcox, 'Interest Rates  and  Household  Cash  Flow," Unpublished paper,  Board of Governors  of the
Federal  Reserve,  Dec. 1988.17
and  other  theorists,  have  attempted  to  show that  these  financial  conditions  are  cyclical  and
that  they  interact  with  the  real  cycle.'5
Theoretical  considerations.  Under  this  approach,  data  on  the  historic  cycle  in
leverage  and  lending  permit  inference  about  the  future.  If  current  business  and  financial
conditions  meet  the  description  of  a  cyclical  peak,  then  the  growth  of  lending  would  be
expected  to  slow,  limiting  borrowing  opportunities.  This  theory  appears  to  have  roots  in
Keynes'  General  Theory  and  some  parts  are  recognizable  in  Nineteenth  century  writers.  16
Charles  Kindleberger  should  be  counted  as  a  major  contributor  to  the  understanding  of
financial  stress  and  financial  crises,  while  Martin  Wolfson's  book  presents  statistical
evidence  on  the  post-war  US financial  cycle.' 7
In  Minsky's  theory,  the  upturn  of  the  cycle  begins  in  the  wake  of  a  business
downturn  which  has  cleared  out  much  indebtedness  through  bankruptcy  and  other  forms
of  financial  restructuring.  Then,  the  emergence  of  business  opportunities  in  new  areas
attracts  debt-financed  investment.  Each  successful  investment  increases  confidence  and
motivates  more  investment  and  greater  indebtedness  relative  to  revenues.  The  resulting
expansion  of  investment  lifts  GNP  through  the  multiplier  process  and  by  improving
productivity.
The  expansion  of leverage  cannot  continue  indefinitely;  it  is eventually  choked  off
by  a  decline  of  profits  which  is  brought  on  by  the  exhaustion  of  the  highest  yield
investment  opportunities  and  by  a  typical  end-cycle  rise  of  costs  of  labor  and  raw
materials.  Moreover,  interest  rates  tend  to  rise  towards  the  end  of an  expansion  because
of  the  rising  demand  for  credit  and  because  the  Central  Bank  often  tightens  monetary
policy  to  suppress  rising  inflation:  this  also  works  to  lower  profits.  The  weakness  of
current  profits  deflates  business  expectations  of  future  profits,  which  slows  or  ends  the
boom  in  capital  asset  prices.  This  is a  dangerous  situation  for  highly  speculative  projects
whose  success  depends  on  the  continued  appreciation  of  asset  prices.  The  result  is  an
increased  rate  of  bankruptcy.
The unfolding  of this  process  increases  bank  losses  and  depresses  bank  expectations
about  the  future.  Lending  policy  becomes  more  conservative.  Moreover  monetary  policy
restricts  bank  reserves,  and  hence  the  capacity  to  lend.  Current  loan  losses  may  have
political  consequences  so  that  regulation  of  loan  portfolios  becomes  more  severe.  This
leads  to  a  slower  growth  of  credit,  with  cuts  of credit  to  higher  risk  borrowers.  Slower
1Hyman  Minsky.  Can ati Happen  Again? M.E.  Sharpe:  Afmonk,  New  York,  1982.
'1See Hyman  Minsky.  John Maynard  Keynes.  Columbia  University  Press: New  York,  1975  for  Minsky's  interpretaUon
of Keynes. Walter  Bagehot,  Lombard  Street, (Originally  published  1873), London:  John Murray,  1915 anticipates
modem  discussion  of financial  crises and the role of the lender  of last resort
17 Chades  Kindleberger.  Manias.  Panics  and Crashes. Revised  edition,  Basic  Books:  New  York.  1989  and Martin
Wolfson.  Financial  Crises:  Understanding  the Postwar  US Exoerience.  Annonk,  NY:  M.E.  Sharpe, 1986.18
growth  of  domestic  credit  may  translate  into  weaker  real  investment  (assuming  no
compensating  movement of foreign capital)."'
This downturn  is ultimately  explained by the extent  of leverage and the stage of the
real business cycle.  But the downturn  itself is usually set-off  by a chance event.  This may
be a  war,  an energy  shock,  or a  shift  of economic policy,  but  it is typically  the collapse
of a  well respected  business.  As Walter  Bagehot  put  it in the  19th Century:
"Every great  crisis  reveals the excessive speculation  of many houses which no one
before suspected,  and which commonly indeed had not  begun...  until  they were tempted by
the  daily rise  of price and  the surrounding  fever."'9
Much of  the news should  be put  in this  context.  The volatility  of  the New York  stock
market,  the  insider  trading  scandals,  and  current  wave  of  bankruptcy  filings  all  have
historic  antecedents  in  earlier  peaks  of the  financial  cycle.
The  short-term  outlook.  Much  of  the  evidence  presented  above  suggests  that
leverage may now be turning  down.  Specifically,  the evidence on recent  charge-off  rates,
the structure  of the loan  portfolio,  and capital  requirements  all suggest slower growth  of
lending  in  the  short-term  and  a  rationing  of  lending  away  from  higher  risk  borrowers.
This  may  be part  of  the  descent  from  a cyclical  peak  of the  type  described  by  Minsky.
This beginning  of the downturn  may not  be a precise point  in time,  but  rather  a period  of
of  financial  consolidation  that  started  with  the  trough  of  the  market  for  long-term
Treasuries  in the  summer of  1987 and resulting  stock  market  spasm of October  1987.
While  all  this  points  to  tight  credit  in  the  short-term,  there  are  many  positive
aspects  to  the medium term  outlook  for lending.  The realization  of losses sets the  stage
for  the  expansion  of credit  in new areas.  A crisis  clears  over-leveraged  and  inefficient
enterprises  and forces  banks to redr-ce their exposure to risk.  Full  adjustment  of the banks
allows  them to  provide  low-cost  financing  when new investment  opportunities  arise.
There  is  a  faint  possibility  that .the  medium  term  will  bring  a  1929-1933 style
deflation  in  the  United  States.  But  this  is unlikely  because  of  the  strength  of  Federal
spending and of foreign demand.  Moreover the experience of October  1987 shows that  the
Central  Banks of the main industrial  countries remember the lessons of 1929-1933; and that
they now stand  ready as a lender  of last  resort.
"'See Marinn  Wolfson.  "he Causes  of  Financial  Instability."  Journal  of PostKeynesian  Economics  Spring  1990.
pp.  333-355  for  a fuler  exposition  of the  financial  cycle.
'"valter Bagehot  op.  cit..  p. 150.19
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The  outloolc  for  US  commercial  bank  lending  to  the  highly  indebted  countries
Lending  to  the  highly  indebted  countries  may  be a  substitute  for  domestic  lending.  It  is
risky  --like  lending  for  domestic  consumption  or  HLTs.  But  in tie  case  of domestic  loans,
US banks  have  recourse  to  the  US  court  system,  w'  -re they  can  often  recuperate  a large
part  of their  principal.  US regulators  can  discourage  bank  exposure  to  certain  developing
countries.  Moreover  margins  on  lending  to  higher  risk  domestic  sectors  are  significantly
higher  than  lending  to  the  highly  indebted  countries.
For  example,  loans  to  HLTs  yield  about  200  to  300 basis  points  over  LIBODR  while
loans  to  the  highly  indebted  countries  often  yield  around  100 basis  points  over  LIBOR.
One  study  estimates  that  credit  card  lending  in  1988  yielded  an  interest  margin  (after
funding,  management,  and  loss  expcnses)  of  5.1  percentage  points  and  commercial  and
industrial  lending  yieldcd  a  1.8  percent  margin.20  All  this  suggests  that  the  banks  have
'oWyss.  Probyn and  de Angelis,  "The  Risk-Adjusted  Returns  for  Major Investments  Available  to
Thrift  Institutions,"  September  1988.20
an  incentive  to  divert  funds  away  from  developing  countries  and  towards  higher  yield
domestic  lending.  Thus,  it  should  be  no  surprise  that  both  real  and  nominal  US
commercial bank  lending to the highly indebted  countries  have been falling since the early
1980s (Figure  9).
How  general  is  the  US  experience?
This study concentrates  on the US commercial banks,  because the data  is most easily
available,  and  because  of  the  questions  posed  by  the  increasing  leverage  of  the  non
financial  corporate  sector.  But banks in the other countries  could face parallel  difficulties.
The  most  obvious  candidate  is  Japan,  where  many  of  the  regional  banks  appear
undercapitalized  and  thus  exposed to  a severe decline of  the real  estate  or stock  market.
This  matters  for  the  finance  of development  because Japanese  commercial banks  hold  a
sizable  share  (of  perhaps  15 to  20 percent)  of lending  to  the  highly indebted  developing
countries.
It  also  matters  because  any  financial  crisis  would  probably  be  transmitted
internationally  and  involve both  US and Japanese  institutions.  Therefore,  an evaluation
of leverage and bank risk exposure in Japan  and the other major industrial  countries  would
be a natural  extension  of this research.  Fortunately,  data  are available  on leverage of the
non-financial  corporate  sector of other  major  industrial  countries.
A look  at other major  countries.  A number of recent  studies  compares the leverage
ratios  of  the  non-financial  corporate  sector  of  the  Major  Seven countries.  21  Table  4
shows the leverage ratios  from the Borio  study (data  were not  available  for Italy  for  this
measure of leverage).  The United States,  United Kingdom and  Canada  turn  out to be low
leverage  countries  while J. )an,  Germany,  France  and  Italy  are high  leverage countries.
(The country classification  emains valid under alternative  measures of leverage and across
studies).  The difference in the level of the leverage ratios can be explained by institutional
2tSee  Claudio  Borio.  Leveraae  and Financing  of No-Financial  Conpanies:  An  International  Perspective.  Bank  for
International  Settlements  Economic  Paper  no.  27,  May  1990  and  Eli  Remolona.  'Understanding  lnternational  Differences
in Leverage  Trends. Federal  Reserve Bank  of New  York:  Quarterly  Review.  Spring  1990,  pp 31-42.21
and  other  factors.22 But  the  change  in  the leverage  ratio  is  quite  different  outside  the
United  States.  Borio's  main conclusion  is that:
Table  4
Debt  / Assets  of Non-Financial  Corporations
in  Major  Industrial  Countries
|  Countries  1970  li&8  12B2
Low  Leverage
United  States  0.45  0.50  0.51
United  Kingdom  0.51  0.63  0.48
Canada  ,.  0.50  0.54  0.45
High  Leverage
Japan  0.86  0.84  0.59
Germany  0.72  0.81  0.77
France  0.58  0.64  0.47
Source: Claudio  Borio,  op.  Cit.,  p 11. The estimates
are at market  value.
"Borio  offers  several  explanations  of these  differences  In leverage.  One  Is  that,  with  the  exception  of  Japan,  the
high  leverage  countries  tend  to have  underdeveloped  stock  markdts.  This  is true  whether  the  degree  of  development
Is  measured  by  the  ratio  of stock  market  capitalization  to GNP  or by  the  vdoume  of transactions  to  GNP. The  study
argues  that  weak  disdosure  and  Insider-trading  rules  together  with  the  lack  of  pension  and  mutual  funds  explain  the
smalier  role  of  the  stock  markets  In  the  high  leverage  countries.
The  study  concludes  that  the  role  of  banks  as  equity  holders  explains  much  of  the  dfference  In  leverage  ratios.
For  instance,  in Gernany  banks  own  about  10  percent  of equties  and  over  40 percent  of all equity  Is  held in  their
custody;  In  Japan  banks  hold  about  20 percent  of al equities;  In France  they  hold  only  5 percent  but  control  more
through  lnteroddng  directorships  and  through  holding  comnpanies.  In contrast,  US  commercial  banks  cannot  hold
equities.  Furthermnore,  equity  ownership  and  Interlocking  directorships  give  banks  In  the  high  leverage  countries  an
Infornation  advantage.  Control  through  holding  companies  may  permnit  a bank  to secure  Its  loans  through  direct
intervention  with  management.  So  banks  In  the  high  leverage  countries  are  more  able  to  control  risk  and  can  tolerate
higher  bLverage  of non-financial  corporate  bofrowers.22
"With the exception of the United States, since the early 1980s in all countries  rising
profitability  and  cash flows have been associated  with a decline in leverage." 23 Remolona
also  focuses on these results:  US non-financial  corporations  inereasea  their  leverage in the
1980s while Japan  and  other  industrial  country  leverage trended  downward.
Is US business  over-leveraged?
Over-leverage  may  mean  that  the  corporate  non-financial  sector  is  particularly
exposed  to  an  interest  rate  increase  or  another  shocks.  The evidence  suggests  that  US
business is over  leveraged by this  definition:  the debt/value  added  ratio  is unusually  high
and much of the debt is long-term,  while long term rates are rising.  Moreover,  the recent
bankruptcies,  scandals,  and  consolidations  in  the  industry  are  typical  of  the  cyclical
downturn  described  by Minsky and  others.
Over-leverage  may  also  mean  that  the  sector's  borrowing  reduces  economic
efficiency.  Much of the leverage was created  through  the purchase  of stocks  by cash-rich
corporations.24  (The  purchases  were  usually  associated  with  HLTs).  Remolona  shows
that  without  the purchases,  the aggregate  ratio  of long-term  debt  to  assets  in the United
States  would'have  fallen  rather  than  risen.  The purchases  may have reduced  investment
and  research,  and  hence competitiveness.  This  case is convincing  to  most,  but  there  are
dissenters  who  argue  that  the  take-overs  which  motivated  most  repurchases  increased
efficiency by rationally  reorganizing  companies, installing  better  management,  and making
existing  management  more sensitive  to  the interests  of stockholders.
ConcluAns.
1.  The state  of the  overall  loan  portfolio  of the US commercial banks  exposes them
to  the risk  of high  losses relative  to  capital.  This provides  an incentive  to  build capital,
partly  by limiting  the growth  of lending.  The process  is accentiated  by the introduction
of higher and  risk-based  capital  requirements.
2.  Slower growth  of lending  is likely to  limit  US macroeconomic  performance  in  the
short-term,  given a stable  monetary  policy.  The Fed may contemplate  action  to  sustain
the growth of credit  but it may find itself restricted  by pressures on domestic inflation  and
by international  linkages  which affect  interest  and exchange  rates.
3.  In this environment,  commercial banks are likely to reduce lending to all higher risk
borrowers  and  to  continue  to  reduce  their  exposure  to  the  highly  indebted  countries.
23op.  cit p 16.
24See  Remolona,  op. cit.,  p 41.23
Moreover,  such lending is unlikely  to recover  rapidly  --except  at exorbitant  rates.  If this
cycle follows its  historical  pattern  there will be an upawing in the growth  of bank  leading
over the longer term, providing  new opportunities  for credit-worthy  developing  countries.
4.  Financial  problems are likely to  occur outside  the United  states,  partly  because  of
linkages  in real interest  rates  and the covariance  of equity  prices.  This  suggests that  high
global  rates  and  limited  private  credit  flows  for  development  will  be  protracted.
Comparative  research  across  the  industrial  countries  is  necessary  to  sharpen  this
conclusion.24
Bibliography
Altman,  Edward.  "The  Anatomy  of  the  High-Yield  Bond  Market."  Financial
Analysts  Journal,  July-August  1987, pp 12-15.
Avery, Robert,  Gregory Elliehausen  and Arthur  Kennickell.  "Changes in Consumer
Installment  Debt:  Evidence  from  the  1983 and  1986 Surveys  of  Consumer  Finances."
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Oct.  1987, pp 761-778.
Bagehot, Walter. Lombard Street. London: John Murray,  1915 (originally  published
in  1873).
Benderly, Jason  and Edward  McKelvey, "Consumer Debt: Buried Alive?" Economic
Research,  Market  Letter,  Goldman,  Sachs,  February  13, 1989.
Bernanke,  Ben and John  Campbell. "Is There a  Corporate  Debt  Crisis?"  Brookings
Papers  on Economic Actiyity,  Winter  1988, pp 83-139.
Bernanke,  Ben,  John  Campbell  and  Toni  Whited.  "US  Corporate  Leverage:
Developments  in  1987 and  1988." Finance and  Economics Discussion  Series no.  113, Nov.
1989.
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  "Capital:  Risk-Based  Capital
Guidelines;  Final  rule,"  Federal  Register,  Jan  27,  1989, pp 4186-4197.
Borio,  Claudio.  Leverage  and  Financing  of  Non-Financial  Companiea!  An
International  Perspective.  Bank for International  Settlements Economic Paper No. 27, May
1990.
Blume, Marshall and Donald Keim. 'Lower-Grade  Bonds: Their Risks and Returns."
The Financial  Analysts  Journal,  July/August  1987, pp 26-33.
Cantor,  Richard.  "Interest  Rates,  Household  Cash  Flow,  and  Consumer
Expenditures."  Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly  Review, Summer 1989, pp 59-
67.
Comptroller  of  the  Currency.  Leveraged  Financina  and  National  Banks.
Washington,  DC: Comptroller  of the Currency,  1989.
Duca,  John  and  Mary  McLaughlin.  "Developments  Affecting  the  Profitability  of
Commercial  Banks."  Federal  Reserve Bulletin, July  1990, pp.  477-499.25
Eichengreen,  Barry  and  Richard  Portes.  "Dealing  with  Debt:  The  1930s  and  1980s."
Paper  delivered  to  the  World  Bank  Workshop  on  Developing  Country  Debt,  Sept.  22-23,
1988.
Feinberg,  Richard  and  Gordon  Hanson.  "LDC  Debt  Will  Restructure  US Banking."
Challenge,  March-April  1989,  pp  44-49.
Fulton,  Robert,  and  Scott  Brown.  "Will  Variable-Rate  Mortgages  Doom  the
Economic  Boom?"  Market  Letter,  A.  Gary  Shilling  & Company,  March  15,  1989.
Goodman,  John,  Charles  Luckett,  and  David  Wilcox.  "Interest  Rates  and  Household
Cash  Flow."  Unpublished  paper,  Board  of  Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve,  Dec.  1988.
Huizinga,  Harry.  "How  Has  the  Debt  Crisis  Affected  Commercial  Banks?  "  Policy,
Planning  and  Research  Working  Paper  no.  195,  the  World  Bank,  May  1989.
Keefe,  Bruyette  & Woods.  "LBO  Disclosure  Update."  Keefe  BankWatch,  March  29,
1989.
Keefe,  Bruyette  & Woods.  "LBO's  revisited:  What  most  major  banks  are  still  not
telling  US."  Keefe  Bank  Industry  Series,  February  16,  1989.
Kindleberger,  Charles.  The  World  in  Depression.  1929-1939.  (Revised  edition)
Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1986
Kindleberger,  Charles.  Manias.  Panics  and  Crashes.  Revised  edition,  Basic  Books:
New  York,  1989.
Luckett,  Charles.  "Personal  Bankruptcies."  Federal  Res-erve Bulletin,  Sept.  1988,
pp  591-603.
Minsky,  Hyman.  Can  "It"  Happen  Again?  Armonk,  New  York:  M.E.  Sharpe,  1982.
Minsky,  Hyman.  John  Maynard  Keynes.  New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,
1975.
Remolona,  Eli.  "Understanding  International  Differences  in  Leverage  Trends."
Fedcral  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York:  Quarterly  Review,  Spring  1990,  pp  31-42.
Sachs,  Jeffrey  and  Harry  Huizinga.  "US  Commercial  Banks  and  the  Developing
Country  Debt  Crisis."  Brookings  Papers,  Fall  1987.
Simpson,  Thomas.  "Developments  in the  US Financial  System  Since the  Mid-1970s."
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Jan.  1988,  pp  1-13.26
Taggart,  Robert.  "Corporate  Leverage  and  the  Restructuring  Movement  of  the
1980s."  Business  Economics,  April  1990,  pp  12-18.
Warshawsky,  Mark.  'Is  there  a  Corporat.  Debt  Crisis?  Another  Look."  Federal
Reserve  Finance  and  Economic  Discussion  Paper  no.  110,  Feb.  1990.
Wolfson,  Martin  and  Mary  McLaughlin.  "Recent  Developments  in the  Profitability
and  Lending  Practices  of Commercial  Banks,"  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  July  1989,  pp  461-
484.
Wolfson,  Martin.  "Tbe  Causes  of Financial  Instability."  Journal  of Post-Keynesian
Ecnomic,  Spring  1990, pp 333-353.
Wolfson,  Martin.  Financial  Crises:  Understanding  the  Postwar  US  Experience.
Armonk,  New  York:  M.E.  Sharpe,  1986.
Wyss,  David,  Christopher  Probyn  and  Robert  De Angelis.  'The  Impact  of Recession
on  High-Yield  Bonds,"  A report  prepared  by DRI  for  the  Alliance  for  Capital  Access,  July
11,  1989.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
AuIthQ  L  for pape
WPS510  Public  Expenditure  Reviews  for  Antoine  Schwartz  October  1990  C. Cristobal
Education:  The Bank's  Experience  Gail Stevenson  33640
WPS511 The Macroeconomic  Underpinnings  Fred  Jaspersen  October  1990  A. Oropesa
of Adjustment  Lending  Karim  Shariff  39075
WPS512 Social  Security  Reform:  The  Capital  Patricio  Arrau  October  1990  S. King-Watson
Accumulation  and Intergenerational  31047
Distrinut*in  Effect
WPS513 The Business  Cycle  Associated  with  Miguel  A. Kiguel  October  1990  E. Khine
Exchange-Rate-Based  Stabilization  Nissan  Liviatan  39361
WPS514 Restrictive  Labor  Practices  in  Alan  S. Harding  October  1990  A. Joseph
Seaports  33743
WPS515 Stock  Markets  in Developing  Mansoor  Dailami  October  1990  M. Raggambi
Countries:  Key Issues  and a  Michael  Atkin  37657
Research  Agenda
WPS516 International  Capital  Mobility  and  the  Jaime  de Me'o  October  1990  S.  Fallon
Costs  of U.S.  Import  Restraints  David  Roland-Holst  37947
WPS517  Do Wage Distortions  Justify  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Protection  in the U.S.  Auto  and  David  Tarr  37947
Steel Industries?
WPS518  Industrial  Organization  and Trade  Jaime  de Melo  October  1990  S. Fallon
Liberalization:  Evidence  from Korea  David  Roland-Hoist  37947
WPS519  Taxes,  Outward  Orientation,  and  Irene  Trela  October  1990  A. Bhalla
Growth  Performance  in Korea  John  Whalley  37699
WPS520 Trade Reform,  Policy  Uncertainty,  Sweder  van Wijnbergen  October  1990  M. Stroude
and the Current  Account  38831
WPS521 World Bank  Treatment  of the Social  Helena  Ribe  October  1990  M. Abiera
Impact  of Adjustment  Programs  Soniya  Carvalho  31262
WPS522 A Survey  of the  Costs  of World  Brent  Borrell  October  1990  A. Kitson-Walters
Sugar  Policies  Ronald  C. Duncan  33712
WPS523  EC Bananarama  1992  Brent  Borrell  October  1990  S. Lipscomb
Maw-Cheng  Yang  33718
WPS524 The  Kuwaiti  NGOs:  Their  Role  in Aid  Nural  Abdulhadi  October  1990  R.  Grimm
F!ows  to Developing  Countries  31129
WPS525  School  Effects  on Achievement  in  Marlaine  E.  Lockheed  October  1990  C. Cristobal
Secondary  Mathematics  and  Barbara  Bruns  33640
Portuguese  in BrazilPRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
rile  Author  for paper
WPS526  Rural  Poverty  in India,  1973-86  Nanak  Kakwani  October  1990  B. Rosa
Kalinidhi  Subbarao  33751
WPS527 Voluntary  Choices  in Concerted  Ishac  Diwan  October  1990  S. King-Watson
Deals: Mechanics  and  Attributes  Ken  Kletzer  31047
of the Menu  Approach
WPS528  Monetarv  Policy  Instruments  for  Gerard  Caprio,  Jr.  October  1990  W. Pitayatona-
Developing  Countries  Patrick  Honohan  karn
37666
WPS529  The  Sectoral  Structure  of Poverty  Monika  Huppi  October  1990  C. Spooner
During  An  Adjustment  Period:  Martin  Ravallion  30464
Evidence  for Indonesia  in the
Mid-1980s
WPS530  The  Menu  Approach  to Developing  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  Novembar  1990  S. King-Watson
Country  External  Debt: An  Analysis  Ishac  Diwan  31047
of Commercial  Banks'  Choice  Behavior
WPS531  The  World  Bank's  Role  in Shaping  Fred  T. Sai  November  1990  L. Bruce-Diggs
Third  World  Population  Policy  Lauren  A. Chester  31091
WPS532  Privatization  in Turkey  Sven  B. Kjellstr6m  November  1990  T. Nana-Sinkan
36026
WPS533 Government  Revenue  from  Alberto  Giovannini  November  1990  A. Bhalla
Financial  Repression  Martha  de Melo  37699
WPS534  Risk  Facing  U.S.  Commercial  Banks  Menahem  Prywes  November  1990  J. Israel
31285